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I. INTRODUCTION
The educational process at a college or university, where students often experience new-found freedom, includes adherence to
academic and behavioral standards.1 The institution may impose
sanctions on students for breaching these standards.2 Prior to imposing a sanction, however, an institution must provide the student with
a sufficient level of process or risk judicial invalidation of the sanction.3
Courts distinguish the process due a student attending a state institution from the process due a student attending a private institu* Paul Smith is a patent associate in the Intellectual Property Group at Downs
Rachlin Martin PLLC (DRM), practicing in the firm’s Burlington, Vermont office.
DRM is the exclusive member firm for Vermont of Lex Mundi, the world’s leading association of independent law firms.
The author wishes to thank Alice Briggs for her writing advice, Robert Donin,
Dartmouth College General Counsel for many thoughtful and productive discussions, and the attorneys and staff of the Dartmouth College Office of General
Counsel for an enriching time together.
1. See Kwiatkowski v. Ithaca Coll., 368 N.Y.S.2d 973, 979 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1975).
2. See, e.g., Boehm v. Univ. of Pa. Sch. of Veterinary Med., 573 A.2d 575, 578
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (stating that schools may impose disciplinary rules on students as a condition of attendance); see Kwiatkowski, 368 N.Y.S.2d at 979.
3. See Boehm, 573 A.2d at 579.
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tion.4 Related to this distinction is the judicial claim that courts
grant discretion to a private institution’s judgment regarding discipline for academic, as opposed to behavioral, matters.5 However, as
actually applied, the difference between the process due students at
state institutions and those at private institutions is questionable.6
Furthermore, the actual discretion afforded to private institutions for
their academic-violation processes is similarly questionable.7
This article will analyze five issues related to the distinction between state and private institution disciplinary proceedings. First,
this article will analyze the process due a sanctioned student at a private institution. Second, it will compare the process due a sanctioned student at a private institution with the process due a student
at a state institution and assert that the practical differences are
small. Third, it will analyze the judicial claim that more discretion is
afforded private institutions in academic disciplinary matters and
assert that this discretion is applied inconsistently between courts.
Fourth, this article will present the judicial doctrines regarding review of a private institution’s behavioral disciplinary proceedings.
Finally, this article will provide recommendations to private institutions regarding disciplinary policy creation and implementation.
II. PRIVATE EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION DISCIPLINARY LEGAL
REQUIREMENTS
A private institution’s relationship with its students is primarily
contractual.8 In return for tuition and fees paid by students, the institution provides students with classes and instruction, usually culminating in a degree.9 The relationship is not purely contractual,
though, because it has elements of a voluntary association.10 As part
4. Id.
5. See id. at 578–79 (citing Dixon v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150,
158–59 (5th Cir. 1961)).
6. See infra Part III.
7. See infra Part IV.
8. Boehm, 573 A.2d at 579.
9. Napolitano v. Trs. of Princeton Univ., 453 A.2d 263, 272 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1982).
10. Id.
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of this voluntary association, the students must conduct themselves
according to published standards as a condition of graduation.11 For
example, graduation is conditioned on adherence to academic and
behavioral standards established by the institution and typically published in a student handbook.12 Similarly, because the relationship is
primarily contractual, the contract must be followed by the private
institution during disciplinary proceedings.13
In addition to these contractual obligations, a private institution’s
disciplinary proceedings must also be fundamentally fair.14 Fundamental fairness resembles the due process required to impose sanctions on students at state institutions.15 These judicial requirements
have been imposed for policy reasons: Courts recognize that higher
education is no longer a luxury but, rather, an important requirement
of modern society.16
A. The Disciplinary Process at a Private Institution Must Be Fundamentally Fair
Courts require fundamentally fair disciplinary procedures at private institutions.17 Several factors determine the fundamental fairness of the process.18 These factors include: (1) whether the institution’s regulations are reasonable; (2) whether the institution’s regulations are known or should be known by the student; (3) whether the
proceedings are before the appropriate people empowered to act; (4)
whether the hearing panel determines cases based on substantial evi-

11. Id.
12. See id.
13. Boehm, 573 A.2d at 579.
14. 2 WILLIAM A. KAPLIN & BARBARA A. LEE, THE LAW OF HIGHER EDUCATION
§ 9.4.4 (4th ed. 2006).
15. See Boehm, 573 A.2d at 580 (stating that recent courts have required private
educational institution’s disciplinary procedures to be consistent with “basic notions of due process and fundamental fairness”).
16. Kwiatkowski v. Ithaca Coll., 368 N.Y.S.2d 973, 977 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975).
17. See Boehm, 573 A.2d at 580.
18. Id. at 580–81 (quoting Slaughter v. Brigham Young Univ., 514 F.2d 622, 625
(10th Cir. 1975)).

File: Smith - Vol. 9, Iss. 3, V2

2010

Created on: 5/30/2011 11:59:00 PM

Last Printed: 5/31/2011 12:00:00 AM

DUE PROCESS, FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS

447

dence;19 and (5) whether the student has been notified of the
charges.20
For example, by applying these factors, the court deciding
Boehm v. University of Pennsylvania School of Veterinary Medicine
found a private institution’s disciplinary process to be fundamentally
fair.21 Specifically, the disciplinary process was found fundamentally fair because the students were notified of the evidence and
charges against them, they were present at the disciplinary hearing,
and they were assisted in their defense by a faculty advisor.22 Finally, the hearing was before an established disciplinary board that, as a
result of the hearing, made specific findings of fact, thereby meeting
the substantial evidence requirement.23 Therefore, as illustrated in
Boehm, a disciplinary process is fundamentally fair if each of the
above factors is satisfied.
While not analyzed in Boehm, fundamental fairness also requires
that a student be notified of all charges with sufficient particularity
to prepare a defense.24 For example, in Fellheimer v. Middlebury
College, an accused student was notified of a rape charge but not of
a “disrespect of persons” charge.25 Because the accused student was
not notified of this second charge, he was unable to prepare an adequate defense.26 Even though the court did not analyze the other
fundamental fairness factors, the court ruled the process unfair because of this lack of notice.27
Therefore, based on these cases, an institution’s disciplinary
process is fundamentally fair when it contains the previously discussed factors.28 However, fundamental fairness is not the only
measurement used by courts to evaluate an institution’s disciplinary

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id.
Fellheimer v. Middlebury Coll., 869 F. Supp. 238, 245 (D. Vt. 1994).
Boehm, 573 A.2d at 582.
Id.
Id. at 582–83.
Fellheimer, 869 F. Supp. at 246.
Id. at 245.
Id. at 246.
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 20–21.
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procedures.29 Because the relationship between a student and a private institution is primarily contractual,30 a court will also examine
whether the institution adhered to the contract as evidenced by its
published disciplinary procedures.31
B. A Private Institution Must Follow Its Published Disciplinary
Procedures
A private institution must follow its own published disciplinary
procedures because these published procedures embody the terms of
the contract with the student.32 These procedures are bargained for
when the student decides to attend a particular institution33 and are
evidenced by the student handbook and other institutional publications and practices.34 Distribution of the handbook constitutes constructive notice of these established disciplinary procedures.35 For
example, in Kwiatkowski v. Ithaca College, the plaintiff-student was
held to be constructively notified of the disciplinary procedures
when he received the college code of conduct during registration.36
Therefore, in addition to fundamental fairness, a second judicial requirement placed on private educational institutions is that the institution adheres to its published policies, thereby providing actual or
constructive notice to the students.37 However, as important as this
requirement is, the institution can deviate from the published procedures under some circumstances.

29. Boehm v. Univ. of Pa. Sch. of Veterinary Med., 573 A.2d 575, 580 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
30. Id. at 579.
31. Id. at 580.
32. Id. at 579.
33. See Fellheimer v. Middlebury Coll., 869 F. Supp. 238, 243 (D. Vt. 1994)
(“[A] College is nonetheless contractually bound to provide students with the procedural safeguards that it has promised.”).
34. See id. at 242.
35. Kwiatkowski v. Ithaca Coll., 368 N.Y.S.2d 973, 979 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975).
36. Id.
37. See Fellheimer, 869 F. Supp. at 245.
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1. Private Institutions, Disciplinary Process Deviations, and
Fundamental Fairness
While an institution must generally adhere to its published disciplinary procedures, the institution may deviate from the procedures
as long as the overall process remains fundamentally fair.38 For example, even though the established disciplinary process does not
expressly provide for it, an imposed sanction may be overruled by a
senior administration official as long as the overall process remains
fundamentally fair.39 An institution’s ability to deviate from the
process may be legally strengthened by reserving the right to deviate
from the process in the publications establishing the institutionstudent contract.
a. Senior Administrators, Deviations from the Process, and
Maintaining Fundamental Fairness
A disciplinary process remains fundamentally fair even when a
senior administration official increases a sanction beyond that imposed by a disciplinary hearing, even when the official does not have
express contractual authority to do so.40 For example, in Boehm, two
veterinary students were accused of cheating, tried by a disciplinary
panel, and sanctioned by the panel with academic probation.41 However, the Dean of the Veterinary School modified the sanction by
imposing, inter alia, a one-year suspension.42 The students sued on
the theory that the Dean breached the contract by imposing a more
severe sanction than that imposed by the disciplinary panel.43 The
court rejected the students’ argument, implying that even if the Dean
had deviated from the established disciplinary process, the process
remained fundamentally fair, and that a court would not substitute its

38. Id. at 244.
39. Id.
40. See Boehm v. Univ. of Pa. Sch. of Veterinary Med., 573 A.2d 575, 577 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1990) (holding that the Dean acted properly by increasing the sanction
imposed on the students).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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judgment in place of the Dean’s.44 Furthermore, because the sanction imposed by the disciplinary committee was merely a recommendation, and not binding, the Dean did not breach the contract.45
Therefore, while an institution should abide by its contractually bargained-for disciplinary process, it can deviate from the process as
long as the modified process remains fundamentally fair.46
b. Fundamental Fairness and Notice of the Charges
Failure to notify a student of a disciplinary charge is not a fundamentally fair process deviation because it deprives the student of
the opportunity to prepare an adequate defense.47 For example, in
Fellheimer, a student accused of rape sued to enjoin his suspension
because of, inter alia, a breach of contract.48 This claim was based
on the fact that the college did not notify the student of one of the
charges brought against him in the disciplinary proceeding.49 The
court found that deviating from the process by omitting notice of a
serious charge, thereby depriving the student of an opportunity to
prepare an adequate defense, was not fundamentally fair.50 Therefore, omitting notice of a charge from the disciplinary process is not
a permitted process deviation.
2. The Contractual Right to Deviate from the Published
Procedures
An institution’s power to deviate from the disciplinary process is
strengthened when the school reserves the right to deviate from the
process in the student handbook or another publication.51 For example, as discussed previously, the student in Fellheimer brought a

44. Id. at 582.
45. Id. at 585.
46. See Boehm, 573 A.2d at 577.
47. Fellheimer v. Middlebury Coll., 869 F. Supp. 238, 246–47 (D. Vt. 1994).
48. Id. at 242.
49. Id. at 246.
50. Id. at 244, 246–47 (“The College has agreed to provide students with proceedings that conform to a standard of ‘fundamental fairness . . . .’”).
51. Id. at 244.
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breach of contract claim against the college.52 This claim was based
on the college’s failure to provide “procedural protections equivalent
to those required under Federal and State constitutions.”53 While
ultimately ruling for the student on the grounds discussed previously, the court dismissed the breach of contract claim for two reasons.54 First, the published conduct code expressly disclaimed institutional procedural protections coextensive with constitutional protections.55 Second, the published conduct code reserved the right for
the college to modify the disciplinary procedures from those published as long as the proceedings remained fundamentally fair.56
The court acknowledged that this second provision was sufficient to
protect the college from claims for breach of contract.57
Therefore, a private institution’s disciplinary process must meet
two judicially imposed requirements for a sanction to withstand
judicial review.58 First, the disciplinary procedures must be fundamentally fair, and, second, they must be consistent with the published procedures that establish the contract between the institution
and the student.59 This second requirement is less rigid than the first
because senior administration officials can deviate from the process
as long as the deviation preserves fundamental fairness.60
Courts routinely distinguish these two requirements from constitutional due process granted to students at state educational institutions.61 However, in spite of these routine judicial distinctions, there
52. Id. at 242.
53. Fellheimer, 869 F. Supp. at 243.
54. Id. at 243–44.
55. Id. at 243.
56. Id. at 244. The handbook stated: “The following procedures are designed to
promote fairness, and will be adhered to as faithfully as possible. If exceptional
circumstances dictate variation from these procedures, the variation will not invalidate a decision unless it prevented a fair hearing or abrogated the rights of a student.” Id.
57. See id. (stating that the “provision negates any argument that the College has
contractually guaranteed that the specific procedures it has outlined will always be
scrupulously adhered to”).
58. See supra Part II.A–B.
59. See supra Part II.A–B.
60. See supra Part II.B.1.
61. See, e.g., Kwiatkowski v. Ithaca Coll., 368 N.Y.S.2d 973, 977 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1975).

File: Smith - Vol. 9, Iss. 3, V2

Created on: 5/30/2011 11:59:00 PM

452 UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW

Last Printed: 5/31/2011 12:00:00 AM

Vol. 9, No. 3

is little practical difference between the process required at a private
educational institution and the process required at a state educational
institution.
III. PRIVATE INSTITUTION FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS REQUIREMENT
COMPARED TO PUBLIC INSTITUTION CONSTITUTIONAL DUE PROCESS
REQUIREMENT
Because only public institutions must provide students with constitutional due process, courts routinely emphasize that a student at a
private institution subjected to a disciplinary proceeding is not entitled to constitutional due process.62 Rather, the private institution’s
student is entitled to a fundamentally fair proceeding.63 While courts
consistently reject the attempts of students at private institutions to
claim due process rights, constitutional due process for state educational institution discipline is very similar to fundamental fairness
for private institution discipline.64
A. Constitutional Due Process at a State Educational Institution
Requires Notice of the Charges and an Opportunity to Be Heard
As established in the foundational case of Goss v. Lopez,65 state
educational institutions must provide students with constitutional
due process before imposing a sanction.66 Due process for a disciplinary charge at a state institution requires notice to the student of the
charges against him and an opportunity to be heard.67 For example,
in Goss, a number of students were suspended from a state educational institution without a hearing, without an opportunity to present
62. Id.
63. Boehm v. Univ. of Pa. Sch. of Veterinary Med., 573 A.2d 575, 580 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (distinguishing discipline imposed by state institutions compared to
private institutions).
64. See, e.g., Fellheimer v. Middlebury Coll., 869 F. Supp. 238 (D. Vt. 1994);
Kwiatkowski, 368 N.Y.S.2d at 973; Boehm, 573 A.2d at 575.
65. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
66. Id. at 573–74.
67. Id. at 581. Even less due process is required for failing to meet academic
standards; in these cases, no hearing is required to satisfy due process. Bd. of
Curators of Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 87–88 (1978).
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their version of the facts, and, in some cases, without notice.68 Because the suspensions were imposed by Ohio state schools, and because the suspended students possessed a property interest in their
educations,69 the Supreme Court found that constitutional due
process applied.70 The Court also found that the process due required notice and an opportunity to be heard.71 Therefore, Goss resolves the question of the process due a student before a state institution may impose a sanction.72
B. The Similarity Between Constitutional Due Process and
Fundamental Fairness
Even though courts regularly state that fundamental fairness does
not require disciplinary procedures to be consistent with constitutionally required due process,73 these two doctrines lack significant
practical distinctions when they are applied.74 For example, fundamental fairness is analyzed using the factors discussed previously:
notice of the charge and evidence asserted against the student, presence of the student at the disciplinary hearing, assistance with preparation of the defense, and a hearing before an established disciplinary board.75 These factors are similar to the constitutional due
process requirements established by the Court in Goss.76 These due
process requirements are notice of the charges, evidence against the
student, and opportunity for the student to be heard.77 The only
68. Goss, 419 U.S. at 570–71.
69. Id. at 574.
70. Id. at 576.
71. Id. at 579.
72. Id. at 581.
73. Napolitano v. Trs. of Princeton Univ., 453 A.2d 263, 273 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1982) (citing State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615, 619 (N.J. 1980)); see
Boehm v. Univ. of Pa. Sch. of Veterinary Med., 573 A.2d 575, 580 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1990) (distinguishing standards for imposing discipline in state institutions from
private institutions).
74. Compare Goss, 419 U.S. at 572, 574, 579, with Boehm, 573 A.2d at 581–82
(both stating that notice, an opportunity to be heard, and a non-arbitrary decision
are sufficient to meet their respective standards).
75. Boehm, 573 A.2d at 582.
76. See Goss, 419 U.S. at 572, 579.
77. Id.
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possible substantive difference between fundamental fairness and
constitutional due process is that Goss does not require that a student
be assisted with his defense, as fundamental fairness may.78 Because
this difference is only a single factor within the fundamental fairness
analysis and the remaining elements, including notice of charges and
an opportunity to be heard, are the same between the two doctrines,
they are more similar than courts acknowledge.79
An example of private institution fundamental fairness being
practically equivalent to public institution constitutional due process
can be seen in Kwiatkowski. In Kwiatkowski, a student was accused
of throwing his mattress out of a tenth-story dormitory window.80
After being sanctioned by a disciplinary panel, the student sued to
enjoin his suspension on the theory that he was denied constitutional
due process.81 The court rejected the student’s claim because the
private institution followed its published disciplinary process and the
disciplinary process was fundamentally fair.82 However, even
though the court rejected the student’s due process argument, the
student received protections practically equivalent to those required
by due process.83 For example, as part of fundamental fairness, the
student was notified of the charges against him and had an opportunity to be heard by a disciplinary panel.84 These two elements of

78. Compare id. at 583 (stating that assistance of counsel is not required at the
hearing), with Boehm, 573 A.2d at 582 (stating that assistance of counsel at the
hearing is a factor contributing to fundamental fairness).
79. Napolitano v. Trs. of Princeton Univ., 453 A.2d 263, 273 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1982) (citing State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615, 619 (N.J. 1980)); see
Boehm, 573 A.2d 575, 580 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (distinguishing standards for
imposing discipline in state institutions from private institutions).
80. Kwiatkowski v. Ithaca Coll., 368 N.Y.S.2d 973, 976 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975).
81. Id. at 977. In this case, the court rejected the student’s attempt to claim constitutional due process of a criminal defendant, including the right to remain silent,
assistance of counsel, and the right to confront witnesses. Id. at 978. These rights
far exceed constitutional due process requirements in educational matters. Goss,
419 U.S. at 572.
82. See Kwiatkowski, 368 N.Y.S.2d at 977 (citing the requirement for a fundamentally fair process and ruling for the defendant college).
83. Id. at 976.
84. Id.
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fundamental fairness are practically equivalent to elements of constitutional due process for state educational institutions.85
As discussed, courts claim a distinction between the process due
students at state educational institutions versus private educational
institutions. However, this distinction is often made in response to a
student attempting to claim the process due a criminal defendant.86
This is exemplified in Kwiatkowski, in which the student attempted
to claim all aspects of criminal due process.87 Also, the actual differences between educational due process requirements and private
institution fundamental fairness, as they are applied, are debatable.
Similar to this previously discussed distinction without a difference, courts often claim to give private educational institutions additional deference when reviewing academic, as opposed to behavioral, disciplinary cases.88 Similar to the previous discussion, this judicially claimed distinction is often also illusory.
IV. THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION FOR PRIVATE
INSTITUTIONS
Courts regularly assert a distinction between the judicial review
of academic disciplinary proceedings and behavioral disciplinary
proceedings conducted by private educational institutions.89 Specifically, courts claim to grant discretion to private institutions regarding
their review of academic disciplinary proceedings, which they do not
grant when reviewing behavioral disciplinary proceedings.90 Even

85. Goss, 419 U.S. at 572.
86. See Kwiatkowski, 368 N.Y.S.2d at 978 (claiming due process violations for
lack of assistance of counsel, “inability to remain silent,” and lack of ability to
confront witnesses). None of these rights comprise due process in state educational institution cases but are included in criminal due process. Goss, 419 U.S. at
572.
87. Kwiatkowski, 368 N.Y.S.2d at 978.
88. See Napolitano v. Trs. of Princeton Univ., 453 A.2d 263, 274 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1982).
89. See, e.g., KAPLIN & LEE, supra note 14, § 9.4.4 (stating this proposition and
citing cases to support it).
90. See, e.g., Napolitano, 453 A.2d at 274–75 (stating the distinction between
academic and behavioral disciplinary proceedings).
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though the accuracy of this claim is dubious, there are two reasons
cited for it.91
The first reason is the claim that private educational institutions
occupy a special place in both academia and society that courts are
reluctant to disturb.92 Specifically, private educational institutions
are “unique in their insulation from state taxation controls and their
self government,” and have intellectual freedom unfettered by state
interference.93 The second reason is that academic disciplinary proceedings involve facts that, for proper judgment, are more likely to
require specialized knowledge particular to an educational institution
setting.94 Less discretion is afforded to behavioral disciplinary proceedings because a behavioral proceeding’s facts are more familiar
to the judiciary and do not require any specialized knowledge.95
Therefore, courts justify granting more discretion for judicial review
of academic sanctions than for behavioral sanctions.96 Courts are,
however, inconsistent in their actual application of this claimed discretion.97
A. The Variation Between Courts in the Degree of Discretion
Granted
Different courts grant private institutions varying degrees of discretion when reviewing academic discipline cases (e.g., cheating,
plagiarism) compared to behavioral discipline cases (e.g., battery,
unlawful alcohol use, sexual assault).98 This variation can be ana91. See Boehm v. Univ. of Pa. Sch. of Veterinary Med., 573 A.2d 575, 582 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1990).
92. Id. (citing Schulman v. Franklin & Marshall Coll., 538 A.2d 49, 52 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988)).
93. Id.
94. See, e.g., Napolitano, 453 A.2d at 275 (explaining that academic sanctions
are beyond the expertise of a court (citing Bd. of Curators, Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 88–89 (1978))).
95. Tedeschi v. Wagner Coll., 404 N.E.2d 1302, 1304 (N.Y. 1980).
96. See id.; Napolitano, 453 A.2d at 274.
97. See infra Part IV.A.1–4. Compare, e.g., Jansen v. Emory Univ., 440 F.
Supp. 1060, 1063 (N.D. Ga. 1977), with Boehm, 573 A.2d at 582 (illustrating the
differing levels of discretion afforded private institutions for academic disciplinary
proceedings).
98. See infra Parts IV.A.1–4.
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lyzed by grouping cases into four classes of the judicial discretion
actually granted. An institution receives the most discretion when a
court refuses to analyze the case beyond an initial determination that
the matter involves only academic discipline.99 The institution receives less discretion when a court conducts an analysis of the institution’s adherence to its contract with the student and the fundamental
fairness of the process.100 Even less discretion is afforded to the institution when a court conducts a thorough factual analysis of all
aspects of the case.101 This thorough analysis allows the court to
review the institution’s handling of its disciplinary proceeding, thereby denying the institution the discretion purportedly granted.102
Finally, a court affords the least discretion when it conducts a de
novo review of the factual record and declines to grant any discretion.103
1. The Greatest Amount of Discretion Is Granted When a Court
Declines to Review Any Aspect of the Academic Disciplinary
Proceeding
A court grants a private institution the most discretion for academic disciplinary proceedings when the court declines to review
any aspect of the case beyond determining that the proceeding is
genuinely an academic matter and not a behavioral one.104 Academic matters are those requiring the specialized knowledge of an educator to judge appropriately, like plagiarism, while behavioral matters
do not require specialized knowledge because they involve facts
courts regularly deal with, like sexual assault.105 By declining to
review a case beyond this threshold, the court grants the institution
the most discretion possible because it permits the institution to administer the academic disciplinary proceeding in any way the institu-

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

See infra Part IV.A.1.
See infra Part IV.A.2.
See infra Part IV.A.3.
See infra Part IV.A.3.
See infra Part IV.A.4.
See Jansen v. Emory Univ., 440 F. Supp. 1060, 1063 (N.D. Ga. 1977).
See Tedeschi v. Wagner Coll., 404 N.E.2d 1302, 1304 (N.Y. 1980).
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tion sees fit.106 Additional judicial analysis only reduces the amount
of discretion available to the institution.
For example, the court in Jansen v. Emory University declined to
analyze the case after determining that the issue was genuinely academic.107 Specifically, the appellate court held that neither it nor the
trial court had the legal authority to interfere with the academic disciplinary proceedings at a private institution.108 The court reasoned
that it would not interfere because of the strong policy reasons supporting the self-governance of medical (and dental) schools, including the freedom to determine appropriate academic standards.109
In Jansen, the student enrolled in a dentistry program.110 Over
the course of the student’s education, he consistently violated academic standards: He was among the worst academic performers in
his class, he cheated on an assignment, he improperly assigned his
assignment to a hygienist, he worked on a class project outside of
class, and he injured a patient.111 Finally, over sixty-six percent of
the faculty voted to expel the student.112 The student sued the institution for breach of contract, claiming that the student handbook
guaranteed an accused student constitutional due process.113 The
court rejected this claim, even though the handbook stated that students would receive “due process,” and held that the student’s at106. See Jansen, 440 F. Supp at 1063.
107. See id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1061.
111. Id.
112. Jansen, 440 F. Supp. at 1061.
113. Id. at 1062. The handbook stated: “Attendance at Emory is a privilege and
not a right; however, no student will be dismissed without due process.” Id. The
court responded:
Over these bare bones the plaintiff attempts to drape the entire panoply of due process rights developed by the Supreme Court in cases such
as Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S. Ct. 2701, 33 L. Ed.
2d 548 (1971), and Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 95 S. Ct. 729, 42 L.
Ed. 2d 725 (1975). Based on the assumption that the Emory contract
meant to define ‘due process’ in such a manner, the plaintiff argues
that the process he received was deficient and thus constituted a
breach. The underlying assumption is extravagant.
Jansen, 440 F. Supp. at 1062.
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tempt to invoke constitutional due process as defined by Goss while
attending a private institution was “extravagant.”114
The Jansen court granted this private institution the most discretion possible because it refused to second-guess the decision of the
faculty regarding its academic disciplinary action.115 The court
merely determined that the institutional proceeding was academic.116
Beyond this threshold determination, the court declined to consider
any factual disputes alleged by the student because the student conduct at issue was academic, not behavioral.117 In fact, the court
made only a perfunctory examination of the student’s claim that the
institution had acted arbitrarily and capriciously.118 Therefore, because the Jansen court relied almost exclusively on academic disciplinary discretion in its decision by refusing to review other facts, it
afforded the private institution the greatest amount of discretion
possible.
2. Less Discretion Is Granted When a Court Analyzes Fundamental Fairness and Contract Compliance
A court grants less discretion when it performs a factual analysis
regarding the fundamental fairness of the institution’s procedures
and its adherence to the contract with students. This factual analysis
erodes the doctrine of discretion by providing an opportunity for a
court to interfere with a private institution’s academic disciplinary
process. For example, the discretion granted in the academic disciplinary case of Boehm was not as broad as the discretion granted in
Jansen because the Boehm court factually analyzed whether the institution adhered to its contract and whether the process was fundamentally fair.119 Ultimately, because the appellate court ruled for the
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1063.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1063. The court quoted another case stating: “The federal judiciary
should not adjudicate the soundness of a professor’s grading system, nor make a
factual determination of the fairness of the individual grades.” Id. (quoting Keys
v. Sawyer, 353 F. Supp. 936, 940 (S.D. Tex. 1973)).
118. Jansen, 440 F. Supp. at 1063.
119. See id.; Boehm v. Univ. of Pa. Sch. of Veterinary Med., 573 A.2d 575, 582
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
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institution and chided the lower court for interfering with the academic disciplinary process of a private institution, the appellate court
granted greater discretion to the institution than the lower court.120
In Boehm, two students were accused of cheating, tried according to the published disciplinary procedures, found guilty, and sanctioned with, inter alia, one-year suspensions.121 The students sued to
enjoin the sanctions, asserting that the school deviated from its published disciplinary process and that the process lacked fundamental
fairness.122 The trial court granted a preliminary injunction, and the
institution appealed.123 The appellate court then granted the institution discretion by overturning the trial court’s preliminary injunction.124
As in Jansen, the appellate court, acknowledging academic disciplinary discretion, determined that the trial court had abused its
discretion by granting the preliminary injunction.125 However, unlike Jansen, the Boehm court reduced the discretion granted by engaging in a factual analysis of the case.126 Before reaching its decision, the Boehm court thoroughly analyzed the facts relating to the
academic disciplinary process for adherence to published procedures
and for fundamental fairness.127 This is in contrast to Jansen, where
the court declined to factually review the case because the doctrine
granting discretion to private institutions for academic disciplinary
matters prevented judicial interference.128 This distinction between
Jansen and Boehm illustrates that, even where a court grants discretion to a private institution, the degree of discretion granted can vary
from court to court.

120. Boehm, 573 A.2d at 586.
121. Id. at 577.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 586.
125. Jansen v. Emory Univ., 440 F. Supp. 1060, 1063 (N.D. Ga. 1977); Boehm,
573 A.2d at 586.
126. Boehm, 573 A.2d at 582–85.
127. Id.
128. See Jansen, 440 F. Supp. at 1063.
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3. Even Less Discretion Is Granted When a Court Conducts a
Complete Factual Review of the Case
Unlike the two previously discussed judicial approaches granting
discretion to private institutions for academic disciplinary matters
where a court declines, either in whole or in part, to review the case
factually, even less discretion is granted when a court undertakes a
thorough factual analysis of the matter. In this role, the court does
not afford discretion to the private institution because the court is
acting as a “super-trier”129 of fact.130 The following case provides an
example of this third approach to judicial review of academic disciplinary cases.131
In Napolitano v. Trustees of Princeton University, a Princeton
student was accused of an academic offense (plagiarism), tried by
the disciplinary committee, and sanctioned with a one-year delay in
degree conferral.132 After a failed appeal to the university president,
the institution denied the student an injunction staying her sanction.133 The student then sued under a breach of contract theory,
alleging that the institution failed to adhere to its published disciplinary procedures.134 The appellate court upheld the trial court, reasoning that a court may not substitute its own judgment for that of a
private institution in academic disciplinary matters.135 The appellate
court reasoned that substitution was improper because the decision
to impose a sanction for an academic violation is the province of the
expert educator and not a court.136 However, the appellate court’s
own conduct in this case was inconsistent with its hollow recitation
129. Napolitano v. Trs. of Princeton Univ., 453 A.2d 263, 275 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1982).
130. Id. at 276. The appellate court agreed that the trial court properly did not
become a “super-trier,” but then stated: “Our independent examination of the
record satisfies us that the [Committee on Discipline] properly concluded that the
plaintiff had plagiarized,” thereby itself improperly assuming the role of a supertrier and weakening the discretion afforded to the private institution. Id.
131. See id. at 275.
132. Id. at 267–68.
133. Id. at 268.
134. Id. at 267.
135. Napolitano, 453 A.2d at 275.
136. Id.
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of this principle: It stated that becoming a “super-trier” was inappropriate but then proceeded to examine the entire trial record.137
While the Napolitano court discussed affording discretion to the
institution, the court undermined this discretion by conducting an
independent, de novo factual analysis of the trial record.138 By conducting this factual analysis, the appellate court became a “supertrier.”139 For example, in its lengthy opinion, the appellate court
conducted its own examination of whether the student had actually
plagiarized.140 Because the appellate court second-guessed both the
institution and the trial court by conducting an independent factual
review, the actual discretion afforded was negligible, regardless of
the court’s genuflection toward the discretion doctrine.
4. No Discretion Is Afforded When a Court Ignores the
Discretion Doctrine Entirely
Completing the range of inconsistency in the judicial approaches
to granting discretion, some courts fail to even acknowledge the role
of discretion in academic disciplinary cases at all.141 In fact, by deciding a case without acknowledging the role of discretion, courts
weaken the discretion doctrine further by creating a precedent in
which discretion is ignored.
This least amount of discretion that can be granted to a private
institution is evident in the case of Lyons v. Salve Regina College.142
In Lyons, the appellate court contemplated construing the terms of
the published disciplinary procedures against the institution.143
While it did not actually construe the procedures against the institu-

137. See id. at 275–78.
138. See id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See, e.g., Lyons v. Salve Regina Coll., 565 F.2d 200, 202 (1st Cir. 1997)
(stating that the language of the student handbook should be construed against the
college as the author thereof).
142. See generally id.
143. Id. at 202. The court stated, “[w]hile arguably the language should be construed against the College as the author thereof, nevertheless . . . .” Id.
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tion, neither did the court refer to the discretion typically granted to
private institutions.144
In Lyons, a student failed a course required for a nursing degree.145 Upon review of the student’s case by an academic review
board, the board voted 2–1 to give the student an “Incomplete” instead of an “F.”146 However, the Dean overruled the board’s majority and failed the student.147 As a result, the student was not awarded
a nursing degree.148 The student sought to compel the school to
change her grade from an “F” to an “Incomplete,” alleging that the
Dean’s intervention constituted a breach of contract.149 The trial
court ignored the discretion doctrine by substituting its own judgment for that of the Dean and determined that the recommendation
from the disciplinary panel was binding on the Dean.150 As a result,
the student prevailed and the trial court awarded the student a grade
of “Incomplete.”151 The appellate court reversed the trial court by
finding that the term “recommendation,” as used in the disciplinary
handbook, was not binding on the Dean.152
While the student ultimately lost her case and failed the course,
neither the trial court153 nor the appellate court afforded the private
institution any discretion for this academic matter.154 For example,
the trial court deviated from the common understanding of the word
“recommendation” in order to overrule the Dean’s academic disciplinary decision.155 Similarly, while it ultimately chose otherwise, the
appellate court considered construing the contract language “against

144. Id.
145. Id. at 201.
146. Id. at 201–02.
147. Lyons, 565 F.2d at 202.
148. Id. at 201.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 203.
153. Lyons, 565 F.2d at 201 (construing the term “recommendation” to mean an
order binding the Dean to the disciplinary panel’s sanction).
154. See id. at 202 (stating the court’s interest in construing the terms of the handbook against the institution).
155. Id.
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the College as the author thereof.”156 Therefore, based on the actual
and contemplated intervention with the institution’s academic disciplinary process, Lyons shows the extent to which a court may improperly substitute its own judgment for that of a private educational
institution.
Another example of a court failing to grant discretion to a private
educational institution is evident in Melvin v. Union College.157 In
Melvin, a student was accused of “academic dishonesty,” tried by a
disciplinary panel, given a failing grade, and suspended for a year.158
The student sued for breach of contract and sought a preliminary
injunction.159 While the trial court denied the preliminary injunction, the appellate court overruled the trial court and granted relief.160
In its analysis, the appellate court referred only to the traditional
test needed to grant an injunction and did not refer to the need to
afford a private institution discretion in academic disciplinary matters.161 This holding is in contrast to Boehm, where the appellate
court reversed the trial court’s preliminary injunction, citing the lack
of authority to interfere with the academic disciplinary process of a
private institution.162 As with Lyons, Melvin is also an example of a
court’s failure to grant discretion to a private educational institution
in an academic disciplinary matter.
Comparing Lyons and Melvin to Boehm highlights the judicial
inconsistency in affording discretion to private educational institutions. While all factually similar, the reasoning in Boehm differs
from that in both Lyons and Melvin. As in Boehm, the student in
Lyons sued for breach of contract because the Dean imposed a more
severe sanction than that recommended by a majority of the disciplinary panel.163 Unlike Lyons and Melvin, however, the Boehm court
stated that the trial court had no authority to interfere with a private
156. Id.
157. 600 N.Y.S.2d 141 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993).
158. Id. at 142.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. See id.
162. See Boehm v. Univ. of Pa. Sch. of Veterinary Med., 573 A.2d 575, 578 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1990).
163. Lyons v. Salve Regina Coll., 565 F.2d 200, 202 (1st Cir. 1997); Boehm, 573
A.2d at 577.
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institution’s decision to impose a sanction for an academic disciplinary matter by granting a preliminary injunction.164 This difference
highlights the inconsistency in the amount of discretion granted to
private institutions in academic disciplinary matters.
The scope of judicial discretion granted to a private institution
during a court’s review of an academic disciplinary proceeding is
broad. While some courts decline to substitute their judgment for
that of the institution, thereby granting the institution a broad range
of discretion, other courts conduct an independent factual review of
some, or all, of the facts in the case, thereby limiting the institution’s
discretion. Because of this court-to-court variation, private institutions, when drafting academic misconduct policies, should not rely
on the judicial doctrine granting discretion to private educational
institutions when reviewing academic disciplinary matters. However, unlike the judicial review of academic disciplinary matters, courts
are consistent in their approach to behavioral disciplinary matters.
V. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF BEHAVIORAL DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
As discussed previously, courts generally do not afford discretion in behavioral disciplinary matters because these matters are
within the experience of the courts.165 While academic matters may
require the expertise of a professional educator to judge properly,
courts routinely hear cases involving bad behavior and, therefore, are
capable of judging them without deferring to an expert educator.166
When reviewing a private institution disciplinary proceeding for a
behavioral charge, courts apply the two previously discussed procedural requirements: fundamental fairness and the institution’s adherence to its contract with the student.167
An example of a behavioral disciplinary case where the court
strictly applied these two judicial requirements is Kwiatkowski.168 In
that case, the student was charged with behavioral misconduct for
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Boehm, 573 A.2d at 578.
See Tedeschi v. Wagner Coll., 404 N.E.2d 1302, 1304 (N.Y. 1980).
See id.
See supra Part II.
368 N.Y.S.2d 973 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975).
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pushing a mattress through a tenth-story dormitory window.169
Upon suspension by a college disciplinary committee, the student
sued for breach of contract, alleging that the college’s process was
arbitrary and unfair.170
The court ruled that the college’s process was fair and consistent
with the contract, even though the process provided was not coextensive with constitutional due process.171 The court made no reference to the discretion afforded private institutions or to a different
standard of review from academic disciplinary cases.172 Rather, the
court limited its analysis to the process provided to the student using
the judicially required elements: fundamental fairness and adherence
to the institution’s contract with students.173 Because this was a behavioral disciplinary case, no discretion was granted.174
Similarly, in Schaer v. Brandeis University,175 the court properly
reviewed the case only based on whether the college met the two
judicial requirements of fundamental fairness and adherence to the
contract with students.176 In that behavioral disciplinary case, a student was accused of rape, tried by a college disciplinary panel, and
suspended for four months.177 The student sued to enjoin his sanction on the theory that the institution breached its contract by conducting a process inconsistent with established disciplinary procedures.178 Because the court determined that the college adhered to
its published procedures, the student’s claim for breach of contract
failed.179 The court expanded its analysis beyond the complaint and
proceeded to examine the disciplinary process for fundamental fairness.180 While the institution prevailed, the court made no mention
of discretion. In addition, as with nearly all other disciplinary cases,
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id. at 976.
Id. at 976–77.
Id. at 979.
Id.
Id. at 977.
See Tedeschi v. Wagner Coll., 404 N.E.2d 1302, 1306 (N.Y. 1980).
735 N.E.2d 373 (Mass. 2000).
Id. at 378, 380.
Id. at 376.
Id. at 376–77.
Id. at 378–80.
Id. at 380.
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the court expanded its analysis to include both elements of the twopart judicial test, even though the student-plaintiff sued only on a
contract theory.181
Because no discretion is afforded a private institution for behavioral disciplinary matters, institutions must be particularly careful
to administer a process that meets the two-part judicial test. Unlike
Kwiatkowski and Schaer, in Fellheimer, the sanction imposed on the
student was enjoined because the process lacked fundamental fairness.182 The alleged breach was the failure to notify the student of
one charge against him, thereby depriving him of a fundamentally
fair process.183 The court ruled that the institution had breached its
contract with the student because failure to notify the accused of a
charge lacked fundamental fairness.184 Therefore, institutions must
abide by the two judicial requirements in behavioral disciplinary
matters because no discretion is afforded to the institution in these
cases.
VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The process due a student at a private educational institution has
two judicial requirements. The first requirement is that the institution’s process be fundamentally fair. The second requirement is that
the institution meets its contractual obligations to its students.
While courts routinely recite these requirements as the law governing the disciplinary process at a private educational institution,
courts also allege to grant private institutions discretion when reviewing academic disciplinary matters. While many court cases
state that this discretion exists, it is granted inconsistently between
courts.185
Some courts have granted a great deal of discretion by declining
to review academic disciplinary cases. At the other extreme, some
181. Schaer, 735 N.E.2d at 378, 380.
182. Fellheimer v. Middlebury Coll., 869 F. Supp. 238, 244 (D. Vt. 1994).
183. Id. at 242–43.
184. Id. at 247.
185. See Boehm v. Univ. of Pa. Sch. of Veterinary Med., 573 A.2d 575, 578–79
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (stating that such discretion exists and performing a brief
analysis of relevant cases).
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courts have conducted a de novo factual review of academic disciplinary cases. Courts, however, are quite consistent in their analysis
of behavioral disciplinary proceedings. These cases are properly
determined without any reference to discretion because courts are
more familiar with the facts relating to behavioral discipline.
Private academic institutions should not expect to be granted discretion by a court at a trial concerning an academic disciplinary proceeding. Rather, the institution should adopt policies and procedures
that ensure a fundamentally fair process and are consistent with the
published disciplinary policy. For example, to insure a fundamentally fair process: (1) the disciplinary procedures should be published
and distributed to students; (2) the accused student must be notified
of all charges and evidence relevant to the proceeding; (3) the accused student should be permitted assistance in defense by either a
faculty member or another student; and (4) a standing disciplinary
committee having sanction authority should be established with an
ability to record proceeding transcripts.
To ensure institutional compliance with published disciplinary
procedures, the procedures should be kept simple and vague. Furthermore, the published procedures should reserve the right to deviate from the disciplinary process as long as fundamental fairness is
maintained. This reservation of right prevents the terms of the contract from being interpreted “against the college as the author thereof,” as contemplated in Lyons.186

186. Lyons v. Salve Regina College, 565 F.2d 200, 202 (1st Cir. 1977).

